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When is it Rational to Distrust Scientists?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In a recent article published in this journal, Hugh Desmond attempts to show that status differences can rationally justify the conspiracy theorist’s repeated refusal to defer to the authority of scientific experts. We will show that the ‘stubborn distrust’ described by Desmond is irrational. Nevertheless, it raises important questions regarding the authority of scientists to set the bounds of reasonable belief and whether there are circumstances in which the layperson can rationally reject scientific authority. To explore such rational resistance, we consider Love Canal, among the United States’ worst human-caused environmental disasters wherein a working-class community was built atop a chemical waste dump. We examine scientists’ repeated assurances to the residents that their homes were safe and residents’ struggle to convince decision-makers otherwise. We find that resident distrust was warranted and driven either by the irrationality of scientists or by differences in values. This case illustrates how the influence of values in science can lead to a persistent rational distrust of scientific expertise amongst the public and clarifies the bounds of scientific authority. Finally, the rationality of the rejection of scientific expertise at Love Canal helps put in relief what is epistemically problematic when conspiracy theories are irrationally held.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)170-187
Number of pages18
JournalSocial Epistemology
Volume40
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2026

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy
  • General Social Sciences

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