The strategy of manipulating joint decision-making

Jin Yeub Kim; Heung Jin Kwon

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.034

The strategy of manipulating joint decision-making

Jin Yeub Kim, Heung Jin Kwon

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers' joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers' value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the better outside option is critical in determining whether communication is truthful, overselling, or ineffective.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	127-130
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	123
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.034
Publication status	Published - 2014 May

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.034

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The strategy of manipulating joint decision-making

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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