“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury; Sang Hyun Kim

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang Hyun Kim

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	486-493
Number of pages	8
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	104
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012
Publication status	Published - 2017 Jul

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© 2017 Elsevier Inc.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

Cite this

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abstract = "We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.",

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“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Abstract

Bibliographical note

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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