Pluralism about Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism

Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen, Cory D. Wright

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

30 Citations (Scopus)


The past decade has marked a period of significant development for pluralist theories of truth. This chapter utilizes several distinctions to categorize the current theoretical landscape and then compares the theoretical structure of four pluralist theories-namely, strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism. The chapter concludes by arguing that it is difficult for adherents of the three other pluralist views to reject the viability of some form of alethic disjunctivism. By this it is meant that, by the lights of each of these other views, there is a disjunctive truth property that ought to qualify as a legitimate truth property.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTruth and Pluralism
Subtitle of host publicationCurrent Debates
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780199332427
ISBN (Print)9780195387469
Publication statusPublished - 2013 May 23

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Oxford University Press, 2015.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Arts and Humanities(all)


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