Partisan advocates

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


This paper studies the problem of an uninformed decision maker who acquires expert advice prior to making a decision. I show that it is less costly to hire partisan agents than impartial agents, especially under advocacy, and that the decision maker prefers partisan advocacy to other forms of institutions. I also extend the literature, originating with Dewatripont and Tirole , to a setting with contracts that condition on information provided and not just the decision made.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)313-332
Number of pages20
JournalBulletin of Economic Research
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Oct 1

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2012 Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


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