On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules

Yaron Azrieli; Semin Kim

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.010

On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules

Yaron Azrieli, Semin Kim

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A voting rule f is self-stable (Barberà and Jackson, 2004) if any alternative rule g does not have sufficient support in the society to replace f, where the decision between f and g is based on the rule f itself. While Barberà and Jackson focused on anonymous rules in which all agents have the same voting power, we consider here the larger class of weighted majority rules. Our main result is a characterization of self-stability in this setup, which shows that only few rules of a very particular form satisfy this criterion. This result provides a possible explanation for the tendency of societies to use more conservative rules when it comes to changing the voting rule. We discuss self-stability in this latter case, where a different rule F may be used to decide between f and g.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	376-389
Number of pages	14
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	100
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.010
Publication status	Published - 2016 Nov 1

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We thank two anonymous referees, an associate editor, and participants of several conferences and seminars for their comments. Kim gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Council of Taiwan , grants NSC103-2410-H-002-246 and NSC104-2410-H-002-019 .

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Elsevier Inc.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.010

Cite this

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abstract = "A voting rule f is self-stable (Barber{\`a} and Jackson, 2004) if any alternative rule g does not have sufficient support in the society to replace f, where the decision between f and g is based on the rule f itself. While Barber{\`a} and Jackson focused on anonymous rules in which all agents have the same voting power, we consider here the larger class of weighted majority rules. Our main result is a characterization of self-stability in this setup, which shows that only few rules of a very particular form satisfy this criterion. This result provides a possible explanation for the tendency of societies to use more conservative rules when it comes to changing the voting rule. We discuss self-stability in this latter case, where a different rule F may be used to decide between f and g.",

author = "Yaron Azrieli and Semin Kim",

note = "Funding Information: We thank two anonymous referees, an associate editor, and participants of several conferences and seminars for their comments. Kim gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Council of Taiwan , grants NSC103-2410-H-002-246 and NSC104-2410-H-002-019 . Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2016 Elsevier Inc.",

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N2 - A voting rule f is self-stable (Barberà and Jackson, 2004) if any alternative rule g does not have sufficient support in the society to replace f, where the decision between f and g is based on the rule f itself. While Barberà and Jackson focused on anonymous rules in which all agents have the same voting power, we consider here the larger class of weighted majority rules. Our main result is a characterization of self-stability in this setup, which shows that only few rules of a very particular form satisfy this criterion. This result provides a possible explanation for the tendency of societies to use more conservative rules when it comes to changing the voting rule. We discuss self-stability in this latter case, where a different rule F may be used to decide between f and g.

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On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules

Abstract

Bibliographical note

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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