Non-governmental organizations and economic sanctionsi

Youngwan Kim; Taehee Whang

doi:10.1177/0192512116677927

Non-governmental organizations and economic sanctionsⁱ

Youngwan Kim, Taehee Whang

Department of Political Science and International Studies

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

How do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) affect sanction policies? Using two datasets of sanctions and NGOs, we study whether and how US-based NGOs working in a target state can influence the threat and implementation of sanctions initiated by the USA. At the threat stage, the sender government tends to perceive NGOs as a signaling device such that NGOs increase the probability of sanction threat. At the imposition stage, the presence of NGOs in a target state also increases the likelihood of a sender state imposing sanctions. In addition, the sender state tends to implement costly sanctions when NGOs have more field operations in target states. This study provides a systematic explanation of the relationship between NGOs and sanction threat and implementation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	209-224
Number of pages	16
Journal	International Political Science Review
Volume	39
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512116677927
Publication status	Published - 2018 Mar 1

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Y. Kim’s work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund. T. Whang’s work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2013S1A3A2055081).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, © The Author(s) 2017.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Sociology and Political Science
Political Science and International Relations

Access to Document

10.1177/0192512116677927

Cite this

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