TY - GEN
T1 - Maximizing profit on user-generated content platforms with heterogeneous participants
AU - Ren, Shaolei
AU - Park, Jaeok
AU - Van Der Schaar, Mihaela
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - In this paper, we consider a user-generated content platform monetized through advertising and managed by an intermediary. To maximize the intermediary's profit given the rational decision-making of content viewers and heterogeneous content producers, a payment scheme is proposed in which the intermediary can either tax or subsidize the content producers. First, we use a model with a representative content viewer to determine how the content viewers' attention is allocated across available content by solving a utility maximization problem. Then, by modeling the content producers as self-interested agents making independent production decisions, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium in the content production stage, and propose a best-response dynamics to model the decision-making process. Next, we study the intermediary's optimal payment based on decisions made by the representative content viewer and the content producers. In particular, by considering the well-known quality-adjusted Dixit-Stiglitz utility function for the representative content viewer, we derive explicitly the optimal payment maximizing the intermediary's profit and characterize analytical conditions under which the intermediary should tax or subsidize the content producers. Finally, we generalize the analysis by considering heterogeneity in terms of production costs among the content producers.
AB - In this paper, we consider a user-generated content platform monetized through advertising and managed by an intermediary. To maximize the intermediary's profit given the rational decision-making of content viewers and heterogeneous content producers, a payment scheme is proposed in which the intermediary can either tax or subsidize the content producers. First, we use a model with a representative content viewer to determine how the content viewers' attention is allocated across available content by solving a utility maximization problem. Then, by modeling the content producers as self-interested agents making independent production decisions, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium in the content production stage, and propose a best-response dynamics to model the decision-making process. Next, we study the intermediary's optimal payment based on decisions made by the representative content viewer and the content producers. In particular, by considering the well-known quality-adjusted Dixit-Stiglitz utility function for the representative content viewer, we derive explicitly the optimal payment maximizing the intermediary's profit and characterize analytical conditions under which the intermediary should tax or subsidize the content producers. Finally, we generalize the analysis by considering heterogeneity in terms of production costs among the content producers.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84861601349&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84861601349&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/INFCOM.2012.6195804
DO - 10.1109/INFCOM.2012.6195804
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84861601349
SN - 9781467307758
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
SP - 612
EP - 620
BT - 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, INFOCOM 2012
T2 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2012
Y2 - 25 March 2012 through 30 March 2012
ER -