Land developers, states, and collusive clientelism in marketizing China

Their undeniable contribution notwithstanding, the interlocked interests of land developers and local states are frequently condemned as clientelistic collusion and engendered corruption by the party leaders, not to mention a majority of ordinary citizens. Even though the "patron-client"-type entanglement between these actors in the Chinese political economy has been widely recognized, the concrete conditions, which deepen such clientelist structure and mutual penetration, much more than other industries in China and its counterparts in other developing countries, have not been scrutinized. What are the political logics and dynamics of such dyadic relations between these two key actors in the Chinese context and in comparison with other industries? Who are the actors and what are the goods transacted in this industry? Which ownership types of land developer form the industry? How can we link the ownership forms to similar and distinct clientelistic characteristics and their variations? This paper tries to answer this set of questions in order to understand the enigmatic issue of land developers, whose importance is undeniable in contemporary Chinese politics, but on which the established literature has not provided concrete analysis.