International Signaling and Economic Sanctions

Taehee Whang, Hannah June Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)


Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial evaluation of the sender state’s resolve, much less than when a military challenge is observed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)427-452
Number of pages26
JournalInternational Interactions
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2015 May 27

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Political Science and International Relations


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