Informe de auditoría y comportamiento de los analistas de riesgos: El modelo de revisión de creencias

This papers deals with the risk analysts' behavior in dynamic scenarios, through a simulation of the changes in the decisions taken when they consider a chain of elements of additional information relevant for the evaluation of the firm' conditions face to the loan rating decision. Among those elements play a main role the audit report, which is mixed with other financial information seeking to isolate the order and sign bias effects. Some hypotheses from the psychological literature on belief updating applied to financial decisions are tested in turn. The results, after an experimental design with analysts from mayor financial Spanish institutions, are consistent with the hypothesis that the audit report is only relevant when contains some contradiction with other financial news received from the client. The recency effect (more weight to the new evidence that to the old one) is only tested in case of qualified audit reports. Besides, the behavior observed among risk analysts could be described as «skeptical», because they give more preeminence to any information that could make them to deny the loan concession or change to worse the financial conditions give for the client.