Abstract
I estimate a matching model of business-partnership formation to quantify the relative importance of productivity gains, financing gains, and the coordination failure of effort provision (moral hazard) among partners. Productivity gains account for 61% of the gain from the observed partnerships. For partners in the first quartile of the wealth distribution, however, financing accounts for 93% of the gain. The cost of moral hazard corresponds to 42% of the entire gain from partnerships. A loan policy specifically targeting partnerships is less effective in improving welfare than a conventional loan policy that provides loans to individual entrepreneurs.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 531-562 |
Number of pages | 32 |
Journal | RAND Journal of Economics |
Volume | 51 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2020 Jun 1 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2020, The RAND Corporation.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics