Crispin Wright is widely known for having introduced epistemic entitlement, a species of non-evidential warrant, as a response to certain skeptical challenges. This paper investigates a fundamental issue concerning entitlement: it appears to be quite generous, as it appears to apply indiscriminately to anti-skepticial hypotheses as well as a range of radically different—indeed, even incompatible—propositions. It argues that the generosity of entitlement is reflective of an underlying commitment to a form of epistemic relativism. In addition, the paper presents an axiology that helps entitlement theorists to address the pressing issue of how, given the absence of evidence, there can be anything epistemically good about acceptance of anti-skeptical hypotheses and other cornerstones for inquiry. Lastly, the paper argues that the issues of generosity and epistemic relativism are rather deeply rooted: they surface at the level of value. It explains why.
|Number of pages||26|
|Publication status||Published - 2022 Jul|