Efficiency of internal capital market under a controlling-minority-shareholder structure

Daehwan Kim; Taeyoon Sung

doi:10.1080/13504851.2012.671919

Efficiency of internal capital market under a controlling-minority-shareholder structure

Daehwan Kim, Taeyoon Sung

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We examine the efficiency of the internal capital market under three alternative ownership structures - the dispersed ownership, the concentrated ownership and the Controlling-Minority-Shareholder (CMS) structure. Although the highest efficiency is achieved under the concentrated ownership, our analysis shows that the efficiency is higher under the CMS structure than under the dispersed ownership. The efficiency gain is greater if the agency problem between shareholders and the Headquarter (HQ) manager is greater. The conclusion of the analysis is in line with the observed patterns of firm organization in developing economies.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1889-1892
Number of pages	4
Journal	Applied Economics Letters
Volume	19
Issue number	18
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2012.671919
Publication status	Published - 2012 Dec

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Taeyoon Sung acknowledges financial support from Yonsei University under the research project of ‘Research on the Evolution of Chaebols’ Investment Behavior after the 1997 Financial Crisis’.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1080/13504851.2012.671919

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abstract = "We examine the efficiency of the internal capital market under three alternative ownership structures - the dispersed ownership, the concentrated ownership and the Controlling-Minority-Shareholder (CMS) structure. Although the highest efficiency is achieved under the concentrated ownership, our analysis shows that the efficiency is higher under the CMS structure than under the dispersed ownership. The efficiency gain is greater if the agency problem between shareholders and the Headquarter (HQ) manager is greater. The conclusion of the analysis is in line with the observed patterns of firm organization in developing economies.",

author = "Daehwan Kim and Taeyoon Sung",

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Efficiency of internal capital market under a controlling-minority-shareholder structure

Abstract

Bibliographical note

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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