Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism

Peter J. Graham; Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen

doi:10.1111/phis.12177

Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism

Peter J. Graham, Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen

Underwood Division

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	148-166
Journal	Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues
Volume	30
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12177
Publication status	Published - 2020 Oct

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We are grateful to feedback that caught mistakes and led to improvements from audiences at the University of Glasgow, the University of Antwerp, and the University of Cologne, and from written comments from Kim Frost and Anil Gupta. This work was supported by a Yonsei University Research Grant (2020 Special Research Project to Support Academic Research Funds for Humanities and Social Sciences grant no. 2020‐22‐0278) and a Research Award from the Humboldt Foundation.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Philosophy

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10.1111/phis.12177

Cite this

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author = "Graham, {Peter J.} and Pedersen, {Nikolaj J.L.L.}",

note = "Funding Information: We are grateful to feedback that caught mistakes and led to improvements from audiences at the University of Glasgow, the University of Antwerp, and the University of Cologne, and from written comments from Kim Frost and Anil Gupta. This work was supported by a Yonsei University Research Grant (2020 Special Research Project to Support Academic Research Funds for Humanities and Social Sciences grant no. 2020‐22‐0278) and a Research Award from the Humboldt Foundation.",

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Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism

Bibliographical note

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