Abstract
Electronic door locks must be carefully designed to allow valid users to open (or close) a door and prevent unauthorized people from opening (or closing) the door. However, lock manufacturers have often ignored the fact that door locks can be modified by attackers in the real world. In this paper, we demonstrate that the most popular electronic door locks can easily be compromised by inserting a malicious hardware backdoor to perform unauthorized operations on the door locks. Attackers can replay a valid DC voltage pulse to open (or close) the door in an unauthorized manner or capture the user's personal identification number (PIN) used for the door lock.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | 2015 13th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2015 |
Editors | Huseyin Hisil, Ali Ghorbani, Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro, Ahmet Koltuksuz, Vincenc Torra, Jie Zhang, Murat Sensoy, Ibrahim Zincir, Ali Miri |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Pages | 139-144 |
Number of pages | 6 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781467378284 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2015 Aug 31 |
Event | 13th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2015 - Izmir, Turkey Duration: 2015 Jul 21 → 2015 Jul 23 |
Publication series
Name | 2015 13th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2015 |
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Conference
Conference | 13th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2015 |
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Country/Territory | Turkey |
City | Izmir |
Period | 15/7/21 → 15/7/23 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2015 IEEE.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
- Artificial Intelligence
- Hardware and Architecture