TY - GEN
T1 - Designing incentive schemes based on intervention
T2 - 2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011
AU - Park, Jaeok
AU - Van Der Schaar, Mihaela
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - In this paper, we propose a class of incentive schemes based on intervention. We develop a general game-theoretic framework for the design of intervention schemes under imperfect monitoring. We examine a model of slotted multiaccess communication to illustrate our framework. In this model, an intervention device monitors the behavior of agents for a period called the test phase and takes an intervention action which affects agents for the remaining period called the intervention phase. We analyze the problems of designing an optimal intervention rule given a length of the test phase and choosing an optimal length of the test phase. Intervention schemes can induce cooperative behavior by applying intervention following signals with a high likelihood of deviation. Increasing the length of the test phase has two counteracting effects: It improves the quality of signals, but at the same time it weakens the impact of intervention due to increased delay.
AB - In this paper, we propose a class of incentive schemes based on intervention. We develop a general game-theoretic framework for the design of intervention schemes under imperfect monitoring. We examine a model of slotted multiaccess communication to illustrate our framework. In this model, an intervention device monitors the behavior of agents for a period called the test phase and takes an intervention action which affects agents for the remaining period called the intervention phase. We analyze the problems of designing an optimal intervention rule given a length of the test phase and choosing an optimal length of the test phase. Intervention schemes can induce cooperative behavior by applying intervention following signals with a high likelihood of deviation. Increasing the length of the test phase has two counteracting effects: It improves the quality of signals, but at the same time it weakens the impact of intervention due to increased delay.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84869595523&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84869595523&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84869595523
SN - 9783642303722
T3 - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
SP - 221
EP - 232
BT - Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers
Y2 - 16 April 2011 through 18 April 2011
ER -