Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression

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1 Citation (Scopus)


A crisis begins when a potential aggressor makes a threat of attack against a target state, creating a stalemate. The potential aggressor's military technology improves over time, but its true military capability or intention is unknown. I show that the more sensitive the target state is to the danger of potential aggression, the greater the chance that the potential aggressor backs down and the lesser the risk of war. By committing to attacking sooner, the target state can increase security from aggression. My analysis provides a security rationale for counterthreatening to attack to prevent the realization of an aggressor attack.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)112-114
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jun

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier B.V.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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