Cooperative R&D with moral hazard

Jay Pil Choi

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(92)90190-A

Cooperative R&D with moral hazard

Jay Pil Choi

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In cooperative R&D, a noncontractible input is underprovided due to participants' moral hazard problem. However, the first-best outcome can be approached as two inputs, one contractible and the other noncontractible, become more complementary to each other.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	485-491
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	39
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90190-A
Publication status	Published - 1992 Aug

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(92)90190-A

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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Cooperative R&D with moral hazard

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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