Content pricing in peer-to-peer networks

Jaeok Park; Mihaela Van Der Schaar

doi:10.1145/1879082.1879086

Content pricing in peer-to-peer networks

Jaeok Park, Mihaela Van Der Schaar

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We provide a game theoretic model of content production and sharing in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. We characterize two benchmark outcomes: Nash equilibrium (NE) without any incentive scheme and social optimum. We show that the P2P network is not utilized at an NE outcome, whereas social optimum in general requires the utilization of the P2P network. In order to obtain a socially optimal (SO) outcome among self-interested peers, we introduce a pricing scheme where downloading peers compensate uploading peers for content provision. For any SO outcome, we can find a pricing scheme with link-dependent linear prices that achieves the SO outcome as an NE. We illustrate our results with several examples. Our illustration shows that the structures of social optimum and optimal prices vary depending on the characteristics of peers such as cost parameters and connectivity.

Original language	English
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879086
Publication status	Published - 2010
Event	2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10 - Vancouver, BC, Canada Duration: 2010 Oct 3 → 2010 Oct 3

Other

Other	2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10
Country/Territory	Canada
City	Vancouver, BC
Period	10/10/3 → 10/10/3

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Computational Theory and Mathematics
Computer Networks and Communications

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10.1145/1879082.1879086

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AU - Van Der Schaar, Mihaela

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AB - We provide a game theoretic model of content production and sharing in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. We characterize two benchmark outcomes: Nash equilibrium (NE) without any incentive scheme and social optimum. We show that the P2P network is not utilized at an NE outcome, whereas social optimum in general requires the utilization of the P2P network. In order to obtain a socially optimal (SO) outcome among self-interested peers, we introduce a pricing scheme where downloading peers compensate uploading peers for content provision. For any SO outcome, we can find a pricing scheme with link-dependent linear prices that achieves the SO outcome as an NE. We illustrate our results with several examples. Our illustration shows that the structures of social optimum and optimal prices vary depending on the characteristics of peers such as cost parameters and connectivity.

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ER -

Content pricing in peer-to-peer networks

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