Confucian public reason beyond rawls

Sungmoon Kim finds the grounds of Robert A. Carleo III's criticism too narrow, and argues that it fails to take into account his theory's central aim: relevance to actual East Asian societies. Kim revises public reason as a means of public justification in a manner that is deliberately and explicitly non-Rawlsian-liberal-an instrument of democratic perfectionism for the East Asian societies that are sufficiently liberal, increasingly pluralist, and characteristically Confucian. That Carleo measures it by Rawlsian-liberal standards suggests his philosophical commitments have led him to overlook the value of revising public reason in this way. Moreover, the stipulation of basic liberties as constitutional rights along with the democratic version of Confucianism that Kim's theory endorses-which respects important forms of equality and freedom-are intended to allay the concerns raised. Kim also clarifies that there is no dilemma between East Asian liberal democratic institutions and Confucian culture. Addressing Carleo's proposed alternatives, he suggests one is subject to the very criticism levied at his own theory while the other adopts problematic Rawlsian presumptions. Kim's own Confucian public reason is a matter of actual public deliberation, not first principles, making it more democratic and meaningfully "liberal" for East Asian citizens.