Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems

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4 Citations (Scopus)


We study competitive equilibria in generalized matching problems. We show that, if there is a competitive matching, then it is unique and the core is a singleton consisting of the competitive matching. That is, a singleton core is necessary for the existence of competitive equilibria. We also show that a competitive matching exists if and only if the matching produced by the top trading cycles algorithm is feasible, in which case it is the unique competitive matching. Hence, we can use the top trading cycles algorithm to test whether a competitive equilibrium exists and to construct a competitive equilibrium if one exists. Lastly, in the context of bilateral matching problems, we compare the condition for the existence of competitive matchings with existing sufficient conditions for the existence or uniqueness of stable matchings and show that it is weaker than most existing conditions for uniqueness.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)487-509
Number of pages23
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2017 May 1

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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