'Beyond A- and B-Time' Reconsidered

Natalja Deng

doi:10.1007/s11406-010-9257-6

'Beyond A- and B-Time' Reconsidered

Natalja Deng

Underwood Division

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article is a response to Clifford Williams's claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams's claim that the B-theory includes transition, by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- versus B debate.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	741-753
Number of pages	13
Journal	Philosophia
Volume	38
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9257-6
Publication status	Published - 2010 Dec

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Philosophy

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10.1007/s11406-010-9257-6

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'Beyond A- and B-Time' Reconsidered

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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