Agent-based evolutionary labor market model with strategic coalition

Seung Ryong Yang; Jun Ki Min; Sung Bae Cho

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30549-1_1

Agent-based evolutionary labor market model with strategic coalition

Seung Ryong Yang, Jun Ki Min, Sung Bae Cho

College of Computing

Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article › peer-review

Abstract

A real-world labor market has complex worksite interactions between a worker and an employer. This paper investigates the behavior patterns of workers and employers with a job capacity and a job concentration empirically considering a strategic coalition in an agent-based computational labor market. Here, the strategic coalition can be formed autonomously among workers and/or among employers. For each experimental treatment, the behavior patterns of agents are varied with a job capacity and a job concentration depending on whether a coalition is allowed. Experimental results show that a strategic coalition makes workers and employers aggressive in worksite interactions against their partners.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-13
Number of pages	13
Journal	Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science)
Volume	3339
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30549-1_1
Publication status	Published - 2004
Event	17th Australian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AI 2004: Advances in Artificial Intelligence - Cairns, Australia Duration: 2004 Dec 4 → 2004 Dec 6

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Theoretical Computer Science
Computer Science(all)

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10.1007/978-3-540-30549-1_1

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title = "Agent-based evolutionary labor market model with strategic coalition",

abstract = "A real-world labor market has complex worksite interactions between a worker and an employer. This paper investigates the behavior patterns of workers and employers with a job capacity and a job concentration empirically considering a strategic coalition in an agent-based computational labor market. Here, the strategic coalition can be formed autonomously among workers and/or among employers. For each experimental treatment, the behavior patterns of agents are varied with a job capacity and a job concentration depending on whether a coalition is allowed. Experimental results show that a strategic coalition makes workers and employers aggressive in worksite interactions against their partners.",

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AU - Min, Jun Ki

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N2 - A real-world labor market has complex worksite interactions between a worker and an employer. This paper investigates the behavior patterns of workers and employers with a job capacity and a job concentration empirically considering a strategic coalition in an agent-based computational labor market. Here, the strategic coalition can be formed autonomously among workers and/or among employers. For each experimental treatment, the behavior patterns of agents are varied with a job capacity and a job concentration depending on whether a coalition is allowed. Experimental results show that a strategic coalition makes workers and employers aggressive in worksite interactions against their partners.

AB - A real-world labor market has complex worksite interactions between a worker and an employer. This paper investigates the behavior patterns of workers and employers with a job capacity and a job concentration empirically considering a strategic coalition in an agent-based computational labor market. Here, the strategic coalition can be formed autonomously among workers and/or among employers. For each experimental treatment, the behavior patterns of agents are varied with a job capacity and a job concentration depending on whether a coalition is allowed. Experimental results show that a strategic coalition makes workers and employers aggressive in worksite interactions against their partners.

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ER -

Agent-based evolutionary labor market model with strategic coalition

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